Abstract. This article investigates the security problems raised by t h e use of proxy-based runtime meta-object protocols (MOPs) for Java a n d provides an approach for making meta-level code transparent t o baselevel code, security-wise. We p r o ve that, but giving all permissions only to the kernel of the MOP and by using Java's built-in mechanism for propagating security contexts, the permissions required by base-level and meta-level code do not interfere. We illustrate this result in the context of a simple proxy-based runtime MOP that we wrote.
Introduction
Di erent authors have suggested using Meta-Object Protocols (MOPs) as an elegant solution for implementing security mechanisms. However, studying the security issues raised b y MOPs has never been adressed as a problem on its own.
A previous work 2] provided a set of rules for combining together the permissions associated with the di erent protection domains of a typical re ective component-based application. One of the main results was that a proxy-based runtime MOP implied fewer constraints than other types of MOPs.
This article presents an approach that makes it possible to have, securitywise, a completely transparent meta-level in the context of a simple proxy-based runtime MOP that we designed and implemented for Java.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces related work. Our simple proxy-based runtime MOP is described in section 3, while section 4 proposed a technique for making this MOP transparent with respect to security, and section 5 concludes.
Related Work
In this section we rst present a n o verview of the di erent kinds of MOPs that exist for Java, then review some related work on meta-programming and security.
Di erent kinds of MOPs
MOPs come in multiple avours. Depending on the criterion used, many di erent classi cation of MOPs are possible. Ferber 4] , for example, rst proposed to separate between structural and computational re ection. The former is concerned with the structure of a program, that is its classes, inheritance relations and so forth, while the later deals with elements that only exist at runtime, such as method invocation or object creation. Alternatively, it is possible to make a distinction between implicit and explicit re ection, which indicates whether the shifts to the meta-level are visible from the base level or not. However, we h a ve c hosen to follow here a third classi cation of MOPs that uses as a criterion the period in the life of a program when meta-objects are actually in use. The three periods of time we consider are compile-time, load-time and runtime. A speci c MOP may use meta-objects at more than one period in the life of a program. This is why w e end up with six di erent cases (see Fig.  1 ), which range from the most static compile-time MOPs to the most dynamic run-time MOPs. Pure compile-time MOPs perform source-to-source transformations. The di erence with usual pre-processors is that the translation itself is expressed as a Java program which handles meta-objects that represent classes, methods, loops, statements, etc. OpenJava 3] is an example of such a M O P .
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Pure load−time
Pure load-time MOPs perform bytecode-to-bytecode transformations. Like for pure compile-time MOPs, the translation uses meta-objects for providing an object view of the bytecode representation of a class. Most of the time, load-time MOPs are implemented through a specialised classloader object.
Proxy-based MOPs introduce hooks into the program in order to reify runtime events such as method invocation or access to elds. The hooks are introduced either at compile-time, for example by using a compile-time MOP, or at load-time by modifying the bytecode for a class (see Kava 10] ) or even at runtime 7] by using objects that implement t h e proxy pattern (also called wrapper objects). These MOPs do not require any modi cation to the JVM, which explains why some low-level events cannot be rei ed.
VM-based Runtime MOPs rely on a modi ed JVM in order to intercept things that only exist at runtime, such as method invocations. On occurrence of such e v ents, control is transferred to meta-level objects that are standard Java objects. MetaXa 6], Guaran 7] , and Iguana/J 9] are such MOPs.
Security and MOPs
The idea of using MOPs for implementing security m e c hanisms has been explored in a number of di erent works 1, 11] . However, the problem of studying the security problems raised by MOPs received little attention so far.
On several occasions, MOP implementors addressed the issue of security i n their work, but mostly as a side note. Oliva and Buzato in 8] present some ideas on how to discipline the interaction between base-level and meta-level objects in their VM-based runtime MOP Guaran , especially with respect to dynamic recon guration of the binding between the two l e v els. Welch and Stroud in 10] also present some security issues raised by their proxy-based run-time MOP Kava. They introduce the idea of making a clear separation between classes of the kernel of the MOP that are trusted and untrusted meta-object classes developed by third parties.
A simple proxy-based MOP
The purpose of our MOP is to reify two elements of the execution environment of a Java program: method invocations on objects 1 and calls to constructors.
Mapping base-level objects to meta-objects
Deciding which objects are rei ed and which are not is done on a per-object basis: for a given class, non-rei ed instances are created, as usual, using the new operator of the Java language, while rei ed instances are created using a call to the static method MOP.newInstance of our library.
One of the originalities of our MOP lies in the way the programmer declares which meta-level class is to be used when a rei ed instance of a given base-level class is created. Unlike other MOPs, which use a separate le for declaring such mappings, we have chosen to use the interface construct of the Java language instead. More speci cally, w e h a ve an open-ended set of marker interfaces 2 which all inherit, either directly or indirectly, f r o m Reflect (see Fig. 2 ). Each i n terface has a static String eld that contains the name of a meta-level class and that can be overridden by sub-interfaces.
A base-level class implements one of these interfaces in order to declare which meta-object should be associated with a rei ed instance of this class. When it is not possible to modify the base-level class, the programmer can subclass the 1 as opposed to the invocation of static methods. 2 Marker interfaces are interfaces that do not declare any methods but ' ag' a class with a speci c property. The use of marker interfaces has become an idiom of the Java language, as exempli ed by t h e Serializable or Cloneable interfaces. base-level class in order to implement the marker interface in the subclass. This is the case shown in gure 2 where the base-level class pA inherits from class A and also implements the marker interface Active. If this, in turn, is not possible, the programmer can still specify which meta-level class to use by passing its name as a parameter of the call to newInstance.
Meta-level classes
Meta-level behaviours are expressed in meta-level classes that all implement the interface MetaObject. E a c h time a call to a rei ed object is intercepted by t h e MOP, it is rei ed into an instance of class MethodCall and passed to the metaobject associated with the rei ed object as a parameter to the call to the method process declared in interface MetaObject. Our MOP does not impose any constraint on the organisation of the metalevel. It is up to the meta-level objects to handle the creation and organisation of the computations that take place at the meta-level.
Implementation
We implemented our MOP with two main design goals in mind: to provide a nonintrusive rei cation mechanism and to induce as few modi cations of the source code as possible when retro-tting existing code with meta-level behaviour.
Transparent i n terception of method calls is achieved through the use of stub objects. Stub objects are created and returned by the MOP as the result of the creation of a rei ed object and represent the rei ed object for its clients. Stub objects are instantiated from stub classes that are type-compatible with the class of the rei ed object. Then, it becomes possible to use the stub object wherever the original non-rei ed object is expected. What a stub class actually does is simply to rede ne all the methods it inherits from its superclass 3 in order to, within the body of each such method, build an object that represents the call and pass this object to the meta-object associated with the stub. If needed, stub classes can be generated on-the-y by our MOP: the source code is generated and written to the local le system, compiled and loaded just like any other locally-available Java class.
Security and MOP in a single address space
In this section we rst present a quick overview of the security a r c hitecture of Java 2 and then show how, within a single virtual machine and under certain conditions, we obtain an interesting result: using our MOP for adapting baselevel components is perfectly transparent with respect to security.
The Security Architecture of Java
The security a r c hitecture of Java 2 5] is mostly concerned with access control, i.e. protecting access to critical local resources such as les, sockets, or the windowing system. An application is composed of a number of protection domain, which correspond to a URL where classes can be downloaded from or to a set of certi cates that can be used for signing classes. Each protection domain has an associated set of permissions, e a c h permission consists of a resource (say, a l e ) that we w ant to protect access to, and an access mode (such as read, write, ...).
At runtime, each o f the classes loaded inside the virtual machine is associated with a speci c protection domain. Whenever a thread performs a call that requires a speci c permission, the security manager computes the intersection of the permission sets of all the protection domains on the execution stack of the thread. If the resulting set of permissions contains the permission needed for accessing the resource, the access is granted, otherwise an exception is thrown.
The security architecture of Java also provides the doPrivileged construct that limits the computation of the intersection of the permissions of the protection domains where doPrivileged is invoked, and those invoked from it.
A security-aware MOP
In the context of an component-based application that runs within a single virtual machine, we w ant the following property to hold:
In a rei ed call that crosses the boundary between two protection domains, the set of permissions under which the rei ed call is actually executed in the second protection domain after meta-level processing should be exactly the same as if the call had not been rei ed a t a l l .
We will now p r o ve that this property holds with our MOP, g i v en that reasonable permissions are given to the di erent c o m p o n e n ts. Let us consider that we h a ve a component A that calls a method on a component B. This method performs an operation that requires an access check, therefore the set P std of the permissions that are needed for the call to succeed in the standard case is the intersection of the permissions of A and the permissions of B. If the call from A to B is rei ed with a proxy-based runtime MOP like ours, we obtain the chain of calls described in gure 3, which lead to the permission set P ref . I f w e call P the function that maps protection domains to their set of permissions, we h a ve P std = P(A) \ P(B) and
We will now explain step by step how, by making sensible choices with respect to which permissions are granted to each of the protection domain in the above equation, we can build a MOP for which P std = P ref .
Capturing and restoring a security c o n text. With the security a r c hitecture of Java 2 , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o t a k e a snapshot of the set of permissions associated with the current thread with a call to AccessController.getContext(). T h i s call returns a AccessControlContext object that represents the permissions available to the current thread at the moment of the call. This object can be used later in a call to doPrivileged in order to perform a call under the security context captured within the AccessControlContext object.
We use this feature for capturing the security c o n text when the call is rei ed (in the stub object), and restoring it later when the rei ed call is actually performed on the rei ed object, that is when the execute method is called on the MethodCall object that belongs to the MOP protection domain (see Fig. 3 ).
The security c o n text P captured at the moment of the rei cation of the call is re-injected inside the component M O P , w h i c h leads to and hence P ref = P(A) \ P(Stub) \ P(M O P ) \ P(B) Which is already an improvement o ver the previous value of P ref becausewe have managed to remove the term P(M e t a ) that corresponds to the permission set of the meta-object. Capturing and restoring a security c o n text does not require any modi cation to the base-level classes or to the meta-object component Meta, but only to the classes of the MOP.
In the MOP we trust By nature, the classes of the MOP perform securitysensitive operations. This includes such di erent things as, for example, reading standard user properties, writing the source le of stub classes to the local le system and calling the compiler, or using the Re ection API for invoking nonpublic methods, which also requires a speci c permission.
For all those reasons, we a d v ocate that the protection domain that contains the base classes for the MOP should be granted all permissions. This means that, when using a MOP in a component-based application, the MOP must be fully trusted, which, by the very nature of a MOP, is very much needed anyway. This does not mean at all that the meta-level classes that implement t h e meta-level behaviour (Meta in our example) will all be granted all permissions because those classes actually belong to a di erent protection domain. As the MethodCall class belongs to the protection domain of the MOP, w e h a ve P(M O P ) = 1
Granting permissions to stub classes With our MOP, stub classes can be generated either statically or dynamically. If stub classes are generated statically, it can be assumed that those classes will be bundled with the components that use them. In our case, this means that stub classes will belong to the same protection domain as A, and hence P(A) \ P(St u b ) = P(A) if stubs are generated statically If, on the other hand, stubs are generated dynamically, they all go into the same directory on the local le system, which then becomes a protection domain of its own. As the stub classes are generated by the MOP itself, we believe they should be granted all permissions. It is the MOP that controls what goes into the code of stub classes, and granting all permissions to stub classes should arise from granting all permissions to the MOP classes. As a matter of fact, stub classes never perform any action that may require a permission, all they do is build meta-objects for reifying calls and forwarding them to the meta-level. As a consequence, granting all permissions to the protection domain of the stubs is not a dangerous thing to do, and in terms of permission sets we h a ve: P(St u b ) = 1 and hence P(A) \ P(St u b ) = P(A) which means that in both cases, either static or dynamic, we end up with the same relation. The term P ref then rewrites to: P ref = P(A) \ P(B) which is enough for stating that P std = P ref and we h a ve p r o ved that using our MOP with the strategy and permissions we h a ve implemented does not add or remove permissions to base classes.
Conclusion
Within the context of a proxy-based runtime MOP for Java, we proved that it is possible to prevent the security constraints of the base-level and these of the meta-level from interfering, given that the classes for the MOP (but not the classes that implement meta-level behaviors) are given all permissions. In the near future, we plan to widen the scope of the results presented in this paper and work on designing a general security model for re ective applications.
